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Zivotofsky v. Kerry 
13-628 
 
Ruling Below: Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert granted 134 
S.Ct. 1873 (2014). 
 
Three-year-old child, through his United States citizen parents, brought action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief against Secretary of State, alleging that child, who was born in Jerusalem, 
was entitled pursuant to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act to have “Jerusalem, Israel” 
listed as his place of birth on his U.S. passport. The United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia granted Secretary's motion to dismiss. Child appealed. The Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded for further development of the record, in light of child's amendment of 
the claim for injunctive relief, to seek “Israel” as designated place of birth. On remand, Secretary 
renewed the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and child cross-moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court granted motion to dismiss. Child appealed. The Court of Appeals  
affirmed, and denied rehearing en banc. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded. 
 
Question Presented: Whether a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State, on request, to 
record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born in "Israel" on a Consular 
Report of Birth Abroad and on a United States passport is unconstitutional on the ground that the 
statute "impermissibly infringes on the President's exercise of the recognition power reposing 
exclusively in him." 
 
 
Menachem Binyamin ZIVOTOFSKY, by his Parents and Guardians Ari Z. and Naomi 
Siegman ZIVOTOFSKY, Appellant 
v. 
SECRETARY OF STATE, Appellee. 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on July 23, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
HENDERSON, Circuit Judge 
Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, requires the Secretary 
(Secretary) of the United States Department 
of State (State Department) to record 
"Israel" as the place of birth on the passport 
of a United States citizen born in Jerusalem 
if the citizen or his guardian so requests. The 
Secretary has not enforced the provision, 
believing that it impermissibly intrudes on 
the President's exclusive authority under the 
United States Constitution to decide whether 
and on what terms to recognize foreign 
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nations. We agree and therefore hold that 
section 214(d) is unconstitutional.  
I. BACKGROUND  
The status of the city of Jerusalem is one of 
the most contentious issues in recorded 
history. For more than two millennia, the 
city has been won and lost by a host of 
sovereigns. The controversy continues today 
as the state of Israel and the Palestinian 
people both claim sovereignty over the city. 
It is against this background that the dispute 
in this case arises.  
Since the middle of the twentieth century, 
United States Presidents have taken a 
position of strict neutrality on the issue of 
which sovereign controls Jerusalem. After 
Israel declared its independence in 1948, 
President Harry S. Truman promptly 
recognized it as a foreign sovereign. 
Nevertheless, Presidents from Truman on 
have consistently declined to recognize 
Israel's — or any country's — sovereignty 
over Jerusalem… As the Secretary 
summarized in response to interrogatories 
proposed in this case:  
Within the framework of this highly 
sensitive, and potentially volatile, 
mix of political, juridical, and 
religious considerations, U.S. 
Presidents have consistently 
endeavored to maintain a strict 
policy of not prejudging the 
Jerusalem status issue and thus not 
engaging in official actions that 
would recognize, or might be 
perceived as constituting recognition 
of, Jerusalem as either the capital 
city of Israel, or as a city located 
within the sovereign territory of 
Israel.  
The State Department's Foreign Affairs 
Manual (FAM) contains passport 
administration rules that reflect the policy of 
neutrality. The FAM first directs in detail 
how the applicant's birthplace is to be stated 
on his passport. "As a general rule, enter the 
country of the applicant's birth in the [place 
of birth field on the] passport." If, however, 
the applicant was born "in territory disputed 
by another country, the city or area of birth 
may be written" in lieu of the country. 
Similarly, an applicant may request that his 
passport list the "city or town, rather than 
the country, of [his] birth." Regarding 
Jerusalem, the FAM sets forth a detailed 
policy:  
For applicants born before May 14, 
1948 in a place that was within the 
municipal borders of Jerusalem, 
enter JERUSALEM as their place of 
birth. For persons born before May 
14, 1948 in a location that was 
outside Jerusalem's municipal limits 
and later was annexed by the city, 
enter either PALESTINE or the 
name of the location (area/city) as it 
was known prior to annexation. For 
persons born after May 14, 1948 in a 
location that was outside Jerusalem's 
municipal limits and later was 
annexed by the city, it is acceptable 
to enter the name of the location 
(area/city) as it was known prior to 
annexation. . . .  
The FAM specifically provides that, for an 
applicant born in Jerusalem: "Do not write 
Israel or Jordan" on his passport and, 
further, that Israel "[d]oes not include 
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Jerusalem. . . ." In sum, the State 
Department must record "Jerusalem" — not 
"Jerusalem, Israel" or "Israel" — as the 
place of birth on the passport for an 
applicant born in Jerusalem after 1948.  
Recently, the Congress has attempted to 
alter the Executive branch's consistent 
policy of neutrality. In 1995, it enacted the 
Jerusalem Embassy Act, which provides that 
"Jerusalem should be recognized as the 
capital of the State of Israel"; [and] "the 
United States Embassy in Israel should be 
established in Jerusalem no later than May 
31, 1999"… During the Congress's 
consideration of the legislation, the 
Executive branch communicated with the 
Congress regarding its constitutionality. The 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) 
via an assistant attorney general wrote to the 
White House Counsel: "It is well settled that 
the Constitution vests the President with the 
exclusive authority to conduct the Nation's 
diplomatic relations with other States," that 
"the President's recognition power is 
exclusive" and that "[t]he proposed bill 
would severely impair the President's 
constitutional authority to determine the 
form and manner of the Nation's diplomatic 
relations." The DOJ official explained that 
his conclusions were "not novel"… 
Similarly, the then-Secretary expressed 
opposition to the legislation in a letter to the 
Senate Majority Leader. The Secretary 
explained that … "any effort by Congress to 
bring [Jerusalem] to the forefront is ill-
advised and potentially very damaging to the 
success of the peace process." He echoed the 
DOJ official's doubts regarding the bill's 
constitutionality. Ultimately, the Congress 
enacted the legislation with a waiver 
provision authorizing the President to 
suspend the funding restriction for six-
month periods to "protect the national 
security interests of the United States."  
On September 30, 2002, President George 
W. Bush signed into law the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act. Section 214(d) 
is the provision at issue and it provides:  
(d) RECORD OF PLACE OF 
BIRTH AS ISRAEL FOR 
PASSPORT PURPOSES. — For 
purposes of the registration of birth, 
certification of nationality, or 
issuance of a passport of a United 
States citizen born in the city of 
Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon 
the request of the citizen or the 
citizen's legal guardian, record the 
place of birth as Israel.  
When the President signed the Act, 
however, he also issued a signing statement, 
noting that "the Act contains a number of 
provisions that impermissibly interfere with 
the constitutional functions of the 
presidency in foreign affairs," including 
section 214:  
Section 214, concerning Jerusalem, 
impermissibly interferes with the 
President's constitutional authority to 
conduct the Nation's foreign affairs 
and to supervise the unitary 
executive branch. Moreover, the 
purported direction in section 214 
would, if construed as mandatory 
rather than advisory, impermissibly 
interfere with the President's 
constitutional authority to formulate 
the position of the United States, 
speak for the Nation in international 
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affairs, and determine the terms on 
which recognition is given to foreign 
states. U.S. policy regarding 
Jerusalem has not changed.  
Menachem Zivotofsky (Zivotofsky) is a 
United States citizen born in 2002 in 
Jerusalem to parents who are United States 
citizens. In 2002, Zivotofsky's mother 
applied for a United States passport for 
Zivotofsky, listing his birthplace as 
"Jerusalem, Israel." The State Department, 
however, following its Jerusalem policy set 
forth in 7 FAM 1383.5-6, issued a passport 
in Zivotofsky's name listing "Jerusalem" as 
his place of birth.  
On September 16, 2003, Zivotofsky, "by his 
parents and guardians, Ari Z. and Naomi 
Siegman Zivotofsky," brought suit against 
the Secretary, seeking, inter alia, declaratory 
relief and a permanent injunction ordering 
the Secretary to issue him a passport listing 
"Jerusalem, Israel" as his place of birth. The 
litigation has been up and down the 
appellate ladder. First, on September 7, 
2004, the district court dismissed the case, 
concluding that Zivotofsky lacked Article III 
standing and, alternatively, that the case 
presented a nonjusticiable political question. 
We subsequently reversed and remanded, 
holding that Zivotofsky had standing… We 
"remand[ed] the case to the district court so 
that both sides may develop a more 
complete record relating to these and other 
subjects of dispute."  
On September 19, 2007, the district court 
again dismissed the case, once more 
deciding it presented a nonjusticiable 
political question. We affirmed, concluding 
that "[b]ecause the judiciary has no authority 
to order the Executive Branch to change the 
nation's foreign policy in this matter, this 
case is nonjusticiable under the political 
question doctrine."  
The United States Supreme Court vacated 
and remanded, holding that the case does not 
present a political question. The Court 
explained that "[t]he federal courts are not 
being asked to supplant a foreign policy 
decision of the political branches. . . . 
[i]nstead, Zivotofsky requests that the courts 
enforce a specific statutory right." Given 
that the parties do not dispute the substance 
of section 214(d), that is, its requirement 
that "Israel" be recorded on the passport as 
the applicant's birthplace at his request, "the 
only real question for the courts is whether 
the statute is constitutional," which requires 
"deciding whether the statute impermissibly 
intrudes upon Presidential powers under the 
Constitution." The Court further explained 
that "[r]esolution of Zivotofsky's claim 
demands careful examination of the textual, 
structural, and historical evidence put 
forward by the parties regarding the nature 
of the statute and of the passport and 
recognition powers."  
II. THE MERITS  
Before addressing the merits, we address 
two preliminary matters. First, … 
Zivotofsky maintains that we should not 
reach the Secretary's constitutional defense 
because section 214(d) constitutes 
permissible passport legislation. But 
Zivotofsky's proposed solution — that we 
hold in effect that the President's 
constitutional recognition power is not so 
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broad as to encompass section 214(d) — is a 
constitutional holding. We would not avoid 
"pass[ing] upon a constitutional question" 
by resolving the case in that manner; instead 
we would give the President's constitutional 
power the narrow construction Zivotofsky 
presses…  
Second, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Company v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson set 
forth a tripartite framework for evaluating 
the President's powers to act depending on 
the level of congressional acquiescence. 
First, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to 
an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum." 
… Second, "[w]hen the President acts in 
absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
own independent powers, but there is a zone 
of twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority." … Third, 
"[w]hen the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest 
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter." Both parties agree that this case 
falls into category three. In this category the 
President may nonetheless exercise — and 
the Congress cannot invade — the 
President's "exclusive power." The question 
here is whether exclusive Executive branch 
power authorizes the Secretary to decline to 
enforce section 214(d).  
A. The Recognition Power  
Recognition is the act by which "a state 
commits itself to treat an entity as a state or 
to treat a regime as the government of a 
state." "The rights and attributes of 
sovereignty belong to [a state] 
independently of all recognition, but it is 
only after it has been recognized that it is 
assured of exercising them." Recognition is 
therefore a critical step in establishing 
diplomatic relations with the United States; 
if the United States does not recognize a 
state, it means the United States is 
"unwilling[] to acknowledge that the 
government in question speaks as the 
sovereign authority for the territory it 
purports to control." …  
A government typically recognizes a foreign 
state by "written or oral declaration." 
Recognition may also be implied… 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has 
directed us to examine the "textual, 
structural, and historical evidence" the 
parties have marshaled regarding "the nature 
. . . of the passport and recognition powers." 
We first address the recognition power and, 
in particular, whether the power is held 
exclusively by the President.  
B. The President and the Recognition 
Power  
Text and Originalist Evidence  
Neither the text of the Constitution nor 
originalist evidence provides much help in 
answering the question of the scope of the 
President's recognition power. In support of 
his view that the recognition power lies 
exclusively with the President, the Secretary 
cites the "receive ambassadors" clause of 
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, 
which provides, inter alia, that the President 
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"shall receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers." But the fact that the President is 
empowered to receive ambassadors, by 
itself, does not resolve whether he has the 
exclusive authority to recognize foreign 
nations… 
Originalist evidence also fails to clarify the 
Constitution's text… 
The President's power to receive 
ambassadors may of necessity mean that he 
has the power not only to "receive" a foreign 
ambassador but also to decide whether and 
when to receive him… 
There is little [] ratification-era evidence 
regarding the recognition of foreign 
governments. In fact, "there is no record that 
the subject of recognizing foreign states or 
governments ever came up in the 
[Constitutional] Convention." … In other 
words, the Framers apparently were not 
concerned with how their young country 
recognized other nations because the issue 
was not important to them at the time of 
ratification.  
Post-ratification History  
Both parties make extensive arguments 
regarding the post-ratification recognition 
history of the United States. As the Supreme 
Court has explained, longstanding and 
consistent post-ratification practice is 
evidence of constitutional meaning. We 
conclude that longstanding post-ratification 
practice supports the Secretary's position 
that the President exclusively holds the 
recognition power.  
Beginning with the administration of our 
first President, George Washington, the 
Executive has believed that it has the 
exclusive power to recognize foreign 
nations… In 1817, President James Monroe 
prevailed in a standoff with Speaker of the 
House Henry Clay over the recognition 
power… In 1864 and, again, 1896, the 
Executive branch challenged the individual 
houses of the Congress for intruding into the 
realm of recognition, which eventually led 
the Congress to refrain from acting… In 
1919, the Congress once again relented in 
response to the President's assertion of 
exclusive recognition power… 
Zivotofsky marshals several isolated events 
in support of his position that the 
recognition power does not repose solely in 
the Executive but they are unconvincing… 
Supreme Court Precedent  
It is undisputed that "in the foreign affairs 
arena, the President has 'a degree of 
discretion and freedom from statutory 
restriction which would not be admissible 
were domestic affairs alone involved.'" 
While the President's foreign affairs powers 
are not precisely defined, the courts have 
long recognized the President's presumptive 
dominance in matters abroad. Thus, the 
Court, echoing the words of then-
Congressman John Marshall, has described 
the President as the "sole organ of the nation 
in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations."  
The Supreme Court has more than once 
declared that the recognition power lies 
exclusively with the President. To be sure, 
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the Court has not held that the President 
exclusively holds the power. But, for us — 
an inferior court — "carefully considered 
language of the Supreme Court, even if 
technically dictum, generally must be treated 
as authoritative."  
In Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company, 
the issue before the Court was whether "the 
Falkland islands . . . constitute any part of 
the dominions within the sovereignty of the 
government of Buenos Ayres." The Court 
decided that the President's action in the 
matter was "conclusive on the judicial 
department."  
... 
Similarly, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, without determining whether the 
United States had derecognized Cuba's 
government under Fidel Castro, the Court 
explained that "[p]olitical recognition is 
exclusively a function of the Executive." …  
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1933 
recognition of the Soviet Union led to three 
eases supporting the conclusion that the 
President exclusively holds the recognition 
power…  
In Belmont, the Court held that New York 
State's conflicting public policy did not 
prevent the United States from collecting 
assets assigned by the Litvinov Assignment. 
It noted that "who is the sovereign of a 
territory is not a judicial question, but one 
the determination of which by the political 
departments conclusively binds the courts." 
But the Court then more specifically 
explained that "recognition, establishment of 
diplomatic relations, the assignment, and 
agreements with respect thereto, were all 
parts of one transaction" and plainly "within 
the competence of the President."… 
In Guaranty Trust, the Court held that a 
United States claim for payment of funds 
held in a bank account formerly owned by 
Russia was barred by New York State's 
statute of limitations. In so doing, it relied 
on the Executive branch's recognition 
determination…  
Finally, the Supreme Court in Pink, 
following Belmont, held that New York 
State could not "deny enforcement of a 
claim under the Litvinov Assignment 
because of an overriding [state] policy." The 
Court defined the recognition power broadly 
and placed it in the hands of the President… 
The Court also treated the recognition power 
as belonging exclusively to the Executive in 
Baker v. Carr. It explained that "recognition 
of [a] foreign government[] so strongly 
defies judicial treatment that without 
executive recognition a foreign state has 
been called a republic of whose existence 
we know nothing." … 
Zivotofsky relies on United States v. 
Palmer, where the Court stated that "the 
courts of the union must view [a] newly 
constituted government as it is viewed by 
the legislative and executive departments of 
the government of the United States." But 
this observation simply means that the 
judiciary will not decide the question of 
recognition. When the High Court has 
discussed the recognition power with more 
specificity, as it did in the above-cited cases, 
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it has not merely stated that the judiciary 
lacks authority to decide the issue but 
instead has explained that the President has 
the exclusive authority. In addition, 
Zivotofsky's reliance on Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, is misplaced as the case dealt with 
the recognition of Indian tribes which, the 
Cherokee Nation opinion itself explains, are 
materially distinct from foreign nations.  
Having reviewed the Constitution's text and 
structure, Supreme Court precedent and 
longstanding post-ratification history, we 
conclude that the President exclusively 
holds the power to determine whether to 
recognize a foreign sovereign.  
C. Section 214(d) and the "Passport 
Power" vis-à-vis the Recognition Power  
Having concluded that the President 
exclusively holds the recognition power, we 
turn to the "passport power," pursuant to 
which section 214(d) is alleged to have been 
enacted. We must decide whether the 
Congress validly exercised its passport 
power in enacting section 214(d) or whether 
section 214(d) "impermissibly intrudes" on 
the President's exclusive recognition power.  
Zivotofsky first contends that section 214(d) 
is a permissible exercise of the Congress's 
"passport power." In its remand to us, the 
Supreme Court directed that we examine, 
inter alia, the parties' evidence regarding 
"the nature of . . . the passport . . . power[]." 
Neither party has made clear the textual 
source of the passport power in the 
Constitution, suggesting that it may come 
from the Congress's power regarding 
immigration and foreign commerce. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the Congress has 
exercised its legislative power to address the 
subject of passports. It does not, however, 
have exclusive control over all passport 
matters. Rather, the Executive branch has 
long been involved in exercising the 
passport power, especially if foreign policy 
is implicated… After the first passport law 
was enacted in 1856, "[t]he President and 
the Secretary of State consistently construed 
the 1856 Act to preserve their authority to 
withhold passports on national security and 
foreign policy grounds." And once the 
Congress enacted the Passport Act of 1926, 
each successive President interpreted the 
Act to give him the authority to control the 
issuance of passports for national security or 
foreign policy reasons… 
Zivotofsky relies on Supreme Court 
precedent that, he contends, shows the 
Executive cannot regulate passports unless 
the Congress has authorized him to do so. In 
both cases cited, the Court held that the 
Executive branch acted properly once the 
Congress had authorized it to so act. But in 
neither case did the Court state that the 
Congress's power over passports was 
exclusive. Indeed, in Haig, the Court made 
clear that it did not decide that issue. 
Likewise, in Zemel, the Court in effect 
rejected the dissenters' statements implying 
that the Congress exclusively regulates 
passports. Instead, the Court emphasized 
that the "Congress — in giving the 
Executive authority over matters of foreign 
affairs — must of necessity paint with a 
brush broader than that it customarily wields 
in domestic areas." Thus, while the 
Congress has the power to enact passport 
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legislation, its passport power is not 
exclusive… 
The question we must answer, then, is 
whether section 214(d) — which speaks 
only to passports — nonetheless interferes 
with the President's exclusive recognition 
power. Zivotofsky contends that section 
214(d) causes no such interference because 
of its limited reach, that is, it simply 
regulates one detail of one limited type of 
passport. But the President's recognition 
power "is not limited to a determination of 
the government to be recognized"; it also 
"includes the power to determine the policy 
which is to govern the question of 
recognition." Applying this rule, the Pink 
Court held that New York State policy was 
superseded by the Litvinov Assignment 
when the policy — which declined to give 
effect to claims under the Litvinov 
Assignment — "collid[ed] with and 
subtract[ed] from the [President's 
recognition] policy" by "tend[ing] to restore 
some of the precise impediments to friendly 
relations which the President intended to 
remove" with his recognition policy.  
With the recognition power overlay, section 
214(d) is not, as Zivotofsky asserts, 
legislation that simply — and neutrally — 
regulates the form and content of a passport. 
Instead, as the Secretary explains, it runs 
headlong into a carefully calibrated and 
longstanding Executive branch policy of 
neutrality toward Jerusalem… The State 
Department FAM implements the Executive 
branch policy of neutrality by designating 
how a Jerusalem-born citizen's passport 
notes his place of birth. For an applicant like 
Zivotofsky, who was born in Jerusalem after 
1948, the FAM is emphatic: denote the place 
of birth as "Jerusalem." In his interrogatory 
responses, the Secretary explained the 
significance of the FAM's Jerusalem 
directive: "Any unilateral action by the 
United States that would signal, 
symbolically or concretely, that it recognizes 
that Jerusalem is a city that is located within 
the sovereign territory of Israel would 
critically compromise the ability of the 
United States to work with Israelis, 
Palestinians and others in the region to 
further the peace process." Thus, "[w]ithin 
the framework of this highly sensitive, and 
potentially volatile, mix of political, 
juridical, and religious considerations, U.S. 
Presidents have consistently endeavored to 
maintain a strict policy of not prejudging the 
Jerusalem status issue and thus not engaging 
in official actions that would recognize, or 
might be perceived as constituting 
recognition of, Jerusalem as either the 
capital city of Israel, or as a city located 
within the sovereign territory of Israel." … 
We find the Secretary's detailed explanation 
of the conflict between section 214(d) and 
Executive recognition policy compelling, 
especially given "our customary policy to 
accord deference to the President in matters 
of foreign affairs." By attempting to alter the 
State Department's treatment of passport 
applicants born in Jerusalem, section 214(d) 
directly contradicts a carefully considered 
exercise of the Executive branch's 
recognition power.  
Our reading of section 214(d) as an 
attempted legislative articulation of foreign 
policy is consistent with the Congress' 
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characterization of the legislation. By its 
own terms, section 214 was enacted to alter 
United States foreign policy toward 
Jerusalem. The title of section 214 is 
"United States Policy with Respect to 
Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel." Section 
214(a) explains that "[t]he Congress 
maintains its commitment to relocating the 
United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem 
and urges the President . . . to immediately 
begin the process of relocating the United 
States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem." … 
Various members of the Congress explained 
that the purpose of section 214(d) was to 
affect United States policy toward Jerusalem 
and Israel.  
Moreover, as the Secretary averred earlier in 
this litigation, the 2002 enactment of section 
214 "provoked strong reaction throughout 
the Middle East, even though the President 
in his signing statement said that the 
provision would not be construed as 
mandatory and assured that “U.S. policy 
regarding Jerusalem has not changed.” For 
example, various Palestinian groups issued 
statements asserting that section 214 
"undermine[d] the role of the U.S. as a 
sponsor of the peace process," 
"undervalu[ed] . . . Palestinian, Arab and 
Islamic rights in Jerusalem" and "rais[ed] 
questions about the real position of the U.S. 
Administration vis-à-vis Jerusalem." As in 
Pink, the Secretary's enforcement of section 
214(d) "would collide with and subtract 
from the [President's] policy" by "help[ing] 
keep alive one source of friction" between 
the United States and parties in conflict in 
the Middle East "which the policy of 
recognition was designed to eliminate."  
Zivotofsky argues that the Secretary has not 
suffered — and will not suffer — adverse 
foreign policy consequences by issuing him 
a passport that lists his place of birth as 
Israel. He asserts that the Secretary has 
admitted that, from time to time, the State 
Department has inadvertently issued 
passports with "Israel" as the place of birth 
to citizens born in Jerusalem and that there 
is no evidence that the issuance of the 
passports resulted in harm to the United 
States's foreign policy interests… Likewise, 
Amicus Zionist Organization of America 
exhaustively catalogues official United 
States websites that contained "Jerusalem, 
Israel" before recent revisions… Zivotofsky 
also contends that the Secretary's fear of 
harm is exaggerated because section 
214(d)'s passport directive is not unlike its 
Taiwan directive that allows an applicant 
born in Taiwan to specify as his birthplace 
"Taiwan" rather than "China," which 
directive has been peacefully implemented.  
Nonetheless, we are not equipped to second-
guess the Executive regarding the foreign 
policy consequences of section 214(d). As 
the Executive — the "sole organ of the 
nation in its external relations" — is the one 
branch of the federal government before us  
and both the current Executive branch as 
well as its predecessor believe that section 
214(d) would cause adverse foreign policy 
consequences (and in fact presented 
evidence that it had caused foreign policy 
consequences), that view is conclusive on 
us. Moreover, Zivotofsky's reliance on the 
State Department's earlier, incidental 
references to "Jerusalem, Israel" or inclusion 
of "Israel" on the passports of United States 
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citizens born in Jerusalem is entirely 
misplaced. The controversy does not arise 
because a website or passport at one time 
included a reference connecting Jerusalem 
and Israel. Rather, the unconstitutional 
intrusion results from section 214(d)'s 
attempted alteration of United States policy 
to require the State Department to take an 
official and intentional action to include 
"Israel" on the passport of a United States 
citizen born in Jerusalem…  
D. Zivotofsky's Remaining Arguments  
Zivotofsky challenges the Secretary's 
decision declining to enforce section 214(d) 
on two additional grounds but we find both 
grounds without merit.  
First, Zivotofsky contends that section 
214(d) remedies the State Department's 
discriminatory policy against supporters of 
Israel. He notes that an individual born in 
Tel Aviv or Haifa after 1948 may list as his 
place of birth either "Israel" or his local 
birthplace if he objects to including "Israel." 
An individual born in Jerusalem after 1948, 
as we have discussed, may not choose 
between a country and a locality; rather, his 
place of birth must be listed as "Jerusalem." 
Zivotofsky laments that "[n]o matter where 
in Jerusalem an American citizen may be 
born . . . he or she does not have the option 
given to American citizens born in Tel Aviv 
or Haifa to choose whether to record the 
country or city of birth." We do not decide 
the merits of this contention because 
Zivotofsky did not make it in district court 
and it is therefore waived.  
Second, Zivotofsky argues that President 
George W. Bush's signing statement — 
indicating that section 214 is, in his view, 
unconstitutional — is invalid because he 
should have instead vetoed the enactment to 
register his objection. The signing statement 
is irrelevant…  
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
judgment of the district court dismissing the 
complaint on the alternative ground that 
section 214(d) impermissibly infringes on 
the President's exercise of the recognition 
power reposing exclusively in him under the 
Constitution and is therefore 
unconstitutional.  
So ordered.  
TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring:  
Although I concur fully in the court's 
opinion, I write separately to elucidate my 
thinking about the important and novel 
separation-of-powers question this case 
presents. The Secretary's argument that 
Section 214(d) is unconstitutional turns on 
two subsidiary arguments: first, that the 
power to recognize foreign sovereigns 
belongs to the President alone; and second, 
that Section 214(d) interferes with the 
President's exclusive exercise of that power. 
But I think it best to begin with an issue that 
underlies and helps frame these recognition 
power questions, namely, Congress's so-
called passport power.  
I.  
It is beyond dispute that Congress's 
immigration, foreign commerce, and 
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naturalization powers authorize it to regulate 
passports. Zivotofsky would have us stop 
there. He reasons that because Congress has 
the power to regulate passports and because 
Section 214(d) is passport legislation, the 
statute is constitutional. This argument, 
however, overlooks the independent 
limitations the Constitution imposes even on 
legislation within Congress's enumerated 
powers… For example, the Commerce 
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate 
interstate communications, but a 
communications statute may nevertheless 
run afoul of the First Amendment.  
The fact that Congress has affirmative 
authority to regulate passports thus does not 
resolve the question of whether Section 
214(d) comports with the separation of 
powers… Congress has authority to regulate 
passports; we need only decide whether this 
particular exercise of that authority, Section 
214(d), infringes on the Executive's 
recognition power.  
II.  
As I noted at the outset, in order to 
demonstrate that Section 214(d) is 
unconstitutional the Secretary must begin by 
establishing that the recognition power in 
fact inheres exclusively in the President. 
This is because, as the court explains, a 
President may "take[] measures 
incompatible with the expressed . . . will of 
Congress" only when he acts pursuant to an 
"exclusive" Executive power. If the 
Constitution entrusts the recognition power 
exclusively to the President, as the Secretary 
claims, there remains the even more difficult 
question of whether Section 214(d) intrudes 
upon his exercise of that power. In resolving 
both questions, we find ourselves in 
relatively uncharted waters with few fixed 
stars by which to navigate.  
A.  
I have little to add to the court's thorough 
discussion of whether the Constitution 
endows the President with exclusive power 
to recognize foreign sovereigns. As the court 
details, there is scant constitutional text to 
guide us and little contemporaneous 
evidence of the Framers' intent… To be 
sure, throughout our history Congress has 
often acquiesced in a President's unilateral 
recognition of a foreign sovereign… But 
neither party (nor any of the amici) points to 
any time in our history when the President 
and Congress have clashed over an issue of 
recognition.  
Given all that, it is unsurprising that the 
Supreme Court has had no occasion to 
definitively resolve the political branches' 
competing claims to recognition power. 
True, the Court has consistently and clearly 
stated that courts have no authority to 
second-guess recognition decisions. And in 
so doing, it has often referred to the 
recognition power as inhering exclusively in 
the Executive. That said, the Court has also 
occasionally suggested that Congress and 
the President share that power. Significantly 
for our purposes, the Court has made many 
more statements falling in the former 
category than in the latter… 
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To say that the question has yet to be 
conclusively answered, however, is not to 
say — at least from the perspective of this 
"inferior" court — that the answer is 
unclear. All told, given the great weight of 
historical and legal precedent and given that 
"carefully considered language of the 
Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, 
generally must be treated as authoritative," 
we are compelled to conclude that 
"[p]olitical recognition is exclusively a 
function of the Executive."  
B.  
The critical question, then, is whether 
Section 214(d) in fact infringes on the 
President's exclusive authority to recognize 
foreign sovereigns. The Secretary's position 
is straightforward: By preventing passport 
holders from identifying a place of birth that 
conflicts with the President's recognition 
determinations, the Secretary's place-of-
birth policy implicates recognition. This is 
all the more evident in the context of 
Jerusalem. As Judge Edwards put it, "The 
Secretary's rules regarding the designation 
of Jerusalem on passports . . . plainly 
implement the Executive's determination not 
to recognize Jerusalem as part of any 
sovereign regime." Given that the 
Secretary's place-of-birth policy implicates 
the recognition power and given that Section 
214(d) displaces that policy, the Secretary 
reasons, the statute unconstitutionally 
intrudes on the President's recognition 
power.  
Zivotofsky sees things differently. His first 
and broadest contention is that the 
President's recognition power, even if 
exclusive, does not include the power to 
determine whether certain territory belongs 
to a particular foreign state. The recognition 
power may give the President authority to 
decide whether to recognize a foreign entity 
as a sovereign, he argues, but it includes no 
authority to determine that sovereign state's 
territorial boundaries. This line of argument 
falls well short of its mark. The power to 
recognize a sovereign state's territorial 
boundaries is a necessary corollary to the 
power to recognize a sovereign in the first 
place. For instance, recognizing an 
established sovereign's former colony as a 
new, independent sovereign seems a 
straightforward exercise of what even 
Zivotofsky would concede to be the 
recognition power. But such recognition 
necessarily entails a boundary determination 
— the colony, once formally recognized as 
part of one sovereign's territory, is 
effectively recognized as belonging to 
another. Indeed, precedent binding on this 
court confirms that the recognition power 
includes authority to determine territorial 
boundaries. 
Zivotofsky's narrower argument, powerfully 
developed in amicus briefs submitted by 
members of Congress and the Anti-
Defamation League, is much stronger. 
Letting Jerusalem-born individuals choose 
to designate "Israel" as their place of birth, 
he contends, neither effects a recognition of 
Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem nor 
otherwise interferes with the President's 
recognition power. As he emphasizes, 
nothing in Section 214(d) requires the 
Secretary to list "Israel" as the place of birth 
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for all Jerusalem-born U.S. citizens. Rather, 
it merely enables those Jerusalem-born 
citizens who support Israel to choose to 
designate their place of birth consistently 
with that view. Aside from the Secretary's 
say-so, Zivotofsky goes on to argue, there is 
simply no reason to conclude that the 
statute's limited interference with the way 
the Secretary records a passport holder's 
place of birth implicates the recognition 
power. Nor is there reason to believe that 
implementing Section 214(d) would 
adversely affect foreign policy. Because 
affected passports would list "Israel" — not 
"Jerusalem, Israel" — observers would 
discern no U.S. policy identifying Jerusalem 
as part of Israel.  
What makes this case difficult is that 
Zivotofsky is partly right. As the Secretary 
concedes, a primary purpose of the place-of-
birth field is to enable the government to 
identify particular individuals — e.g., by 
distinguishing one Jane Doe from another 
born the very same day. And the fact that the 
Secretary permits individuals to choose to 
list a city or area of birth instead of a 
country of birth does tend to suggest that its 
place-of-birth policy is also about personal 
identity.  
That the Secretary's policy is about 
identification and personal identity, 
however, does not mean that it does not also 
implicate recognition. In fact, it clearly does. 
Over the years, the Secretary has been 
incredibly consistent on this point: in no 
circumstances — including circumstances 
beyond the Jerusalem issue — can an 
individual opt for a place-of-birth 
designation inconsistent with United States 
recognition policy. For example, because the 
United States never recognized the Soviet 
Union's annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia, the Secretary "did not authorize 
entry of 'U.S.S.R.' or the 'Soviet Union' as a 
place of birth" for people born in these 
areas. Zivotofsky identifies no deviation 
from this policy, nor am I aware of one. The 
Taiwan directive to which Zivotofsky 
repeatedly points only underscores the 
Secretary's consistency. Because the United 
States recognizes Taiwan as an area within 
China, permitting individuals to list 
"Taiwan" as their place of birth comports 
with the Secretary's general policy. 
Moreover, one cannot possibly read the 
Foreign Affairs Manual's application of that 
policy to Jerusalem as anything but an 
attempt to maintain consistency between the 
place-of-birth field and the President's 
decision to recognize no sovereign's claim to 
that city.  
That the Secretary accommodates identity 
preferences to the extent they are consistent 
with recognition policy does little to 
undermine his position that the place-of-
birth field in fact implicates recognition. The 
Secretary has consistently walked a careful 
line, permitting individual choice where 
possible while still ensuring consistency 
with foreign policy. Because the Secretary's 
policy is about both identification and 
recognition, Congress could probably pass 
some laws about the place-of-birth field that 
do not interfere with the recognition power. 
For instance, Congress might be able to do 
little things, like require that the place of 
birth be listed in a particular font. It might 
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even be able to do bigger things, like 
eliminate the place-of-birth field all 
together. Although doing so would inhibit 
identification of passport holders, it would 
not seem to interfere with the President's 
recognition power.  
But in enacting Section 214(d), Congress 
did intrude on the recognition power. The 
statute seeks to abrogate the Secretary's 
longstanding practice of precluding place-
of-birth designations that are inconsistent 
with U.S. recognition policy. According to 
the Secretary, Section 214(d) would also 
have consequences for the President's 
carefully guarded neutrality on the question 
of Jerusalem. Although Zivotofsky 
challenges the President's judgment that 
adverse foreign policy consequences would 
flow from implementing Section 214(d), he 
offers no reason why the President's exercise 
of his constitutional power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns should hinge on a 
showing of adverse consequences. Even 
more importantly, courts are not in the 
business of second-guessing the President's 
reasonable foreign policy judgments, and 
this one is perfectly reasonable. After all, 
"[a] passport is, in a sense, a letter of 
introduction in which the issuing sovereign 
vouches for the bearer." And it is certainly 
plausible, as the Secretary insists, that 
American-issued passports listing "Israel" as 
the place of birth for Jerusalem-born citizens 
could disrupt decades of considered 
neutrality on the Jerusalem question.  
If this were all we had — only the 
Secretary's reasonable judgment that Section 
214(d) infringes on the Executive's 
exclusive recognition power — it might well 
be enough. After all, the Supreme Court has 
held that the recognition power "includes the 
power to determine the policy which is to 
govern the question of recognition." But 
there is more. As it turns out, this is not a 
case in which we must choose between the 
President's characterization of a statute as 
implicating recognition and Congress's 
contrary view. Indeed, Congress was quite 
candid about what it was doing when it 
enacted Section 214(d). That subsection is 
part of a provision titled "United States 
policy with respect to Jerusalem as the 
capital of Israel." The other sections under 
that heading are not about passports, they 
are about recognizing Jerusalem as part of 
— indeed, as the capital of — Israel. And 
the legislative history makes doubly clear 
that recognition was Congress's goal.  
So in the end, this is a separation-of-powers 
dispute in which both branches involved in 
the struggle actually agree. Congress 
intended Section 214(d) to alter recognition 
policy with respect to Jerusalem, and the 
President sees it the same way. Our decision 
makes us the third and final branch to reach 
this conclusion. And because the recognition 
power belongs exclusively to the President, 
that means Section 214(d) is 
unconstitutional.  
III.  
Although the foregoing analysis largely 
resolves this case, there is one loose end I 
think merits mention: Zivotofsky's argument 
that the Secretary's place-of-birth policy 
discriminates against supporters of Israel. In 
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its most effective formulation, I take the 
point as follows: Under the Secretary's 
policy, supporters of Palestine born in Tel 
Aviv can use their passports to signal their 
rejection of Israel's claim to sovereignty by 
choosing to list "Tel Aviv" instead of 
"Israel" as their place of birth. By contrast, 
supporters of Israel born in Jerusalem cannot 
use their passports to signal their view that 
Jerusalem is part of Israel. Thus, the policy 
discriminates against Israel supporters, and 
Section 214(d) remedies that discrimination.  
To the extent this is an independent claim 
that the Secretary's policy is discriminatory, 
I agree it is waived. To the extent the 
argument is that Section 214(d) is 
constitutional because it remedies unlawful 
discrimination, such argument cannot 
overcome the recognition power problem for 
the same reason the passport power 
argument cannot: legislation Congress 
would otherwise have authority to enact may 
still run afoul of an independent 
constitutional restraint on congressional 
action.  
I nonetheless think it important to note that 
the policy is not discriminatory. Indeed, 
unlike Section 214(d), which permits 
Jerusalem-born Israel supporters to list 
"Israel" as their place of birth but allows no 
parallel option for Jerusalem-born Palestine 
supporters, the State Department's Foreign 
Affairs Manual establishes a facially neutral 
policy that permits individuals to list their 
city or area of birth in lieu of their country 
of birth. The policy applies universally — 
not just in the context of Jerusalem — and 
treats Israel and Palestine supporters 
identically. Jerusalem-born Americans, 
whether supporters of Israel or supporters of 
Palestine, may not use their passports to 
make a political statement. And that is 
because permitting a Jerusalem-born 
individual to list "Israel" or "Palestine" 
would contradict the President's decision to 
recognize neither entity's sovereignty over 
Jerusalem.  
True, as Zivotofsky emphasizes with his Tel 
Aviv example, individuals born within 
territory the United States has recognized as 
belonging to Israel can choose either to list 
"Israel" as their place of birth or instead to 
list a city or area of birth. Israel supporters 
may list "Israel," and Palestine supporters 
may list something more specific. But 
although the political nature of the latter 
choice may be clearer insomuch as it marks 
a deviation from the default country-of-birth 
rule, that is an unintended consequence of a 
neutral policy. Indeed, were the United 
States to recognize the West Bank as the 
sovereign state of Palestine, the same would 
be true of Israel supporters born therein. 
That is, Palestine supporters could list 
"Palestine," and Israel supporters could 
make the more obviously political choice to 
list their city or area of birth. It is only 
because the United States has not recognized 
any Palestinian territory that there currently 
exists no clear analogy to Zivotofsky's Tel 
Aviv scenario. 
70 
 
“U.S. Supreme Court to Review Jerusalem Birthplace Law” 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
April 21, 2014 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to weigh the constitutionality of a law that 
was designed to allow American citizens 
born in Jerusalem - the historic holy city 
claimed by Israelis and Palestinians - to 
have Israel listed as their birthplace on 
passports. 
The case concerns a long-standing U.S. 
foreign policy that the president - and not 
Congress - has sole authority to state who 
controls Jerusalem. Seeking to remain 
neutral on the hotly contested issue, the U.S. 
State Department allows passports to name 
Jerusalem as a place of birth, but no country 
name is included. 
The State Department, which issues 
passports and reports to the president, has 
declined to enforce the law passed by 
Congress in 2002, saying it violated the 
separation of executive and legislative 
powers laid out in the U.S. Constitution. 
In court papers, President Barack Obama's 
administration said taking sides on the issue 
could "critically compromise the ability of 
the United States to work with Israelis, 
Palestinians and others in the region to 
further the peace process." 
The government has noted that U.S. citizens 
born in other places in the region where 
sovereignty has not been established, 
including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
are similarly prevented from stating a 
country of birth on their passports. 
In 2003, Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, the 
parents of U.S. citizen Menachem 
Zivotofsky, who was born in Jerusalem in 
2002, filed a lawsuit seeking to enforce the 
law. They would like their son's passport to 
say he was born in Israel. 
Since the founding of Israel in 1948, U.S. 
presidents have declined to state a position 
on the status of Jerusalem, leaving it as one 
of the thorniest issues to be resolved in 
possible future Israeli-Palestinian peace 
talks. 
When Republican President George W. 
Bush signed the 2002 law as part of a 
broader foreign affairs bill, he said that if 
construed as mandatory rather than advisory, 
it would "impermissibly interfere" with the 
president's authority to speak for the country 
on international affairs. 
The issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 2012 on the preliminary question of 
whether it was so political that it did not 
belong in the courts. The high court ruled 8-
1 that the case could proceed, setting up a 
July 2013 ruling by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
that struck the law down. 
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An estimated 50,000 American citizens were 
born in Jerusalem and could, if they 
requested it, list Israel as their birthplace if 
the law was enforced. 
While Israel calls Jerusalem its capital, few 
other countries accept that status. Most, 
including the United States, maintain their 
embassies to Israel in Tel Aviv. Palestinians 
want East Jerusalem, captured by Israel in a 
1967 war, as capital of the state they aim to 
establish alongside Israel in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. 
Oral arguments and a decision are due in the 
court's next term, which begins in October 
and ends in June 2015. 
The case is Zivotofsky v. Kerry, U.S. 
Supreme Court, 13-628. 
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“Law Giving Jerusalem-Born U.S. Citizens an 
Israeli Birthplace Under Review” 
CNN 
Bill Mears 
April 21, 2014 
The U.S. Supreme Court will take another 
look at an 11-year-old boy's request to have 
Israel listed as his place of birth on his U.S. 
passport. 
The justices announced Monday they would 
review a federal law giving that special right 
to those like young Menachem Zivotofsky, 
who were born in Jerusalem. 
But that is a disputed region in the eyes of 
the Obama administration, which said the 
larger issue should be resolved by bilateral 
negotiations, not by a 2002 congressional 
action favoring the family and the more than 
50,000 other Americans born in the holy 
city. 
Oral arguments by the high court will be 
held in the fall. 
At issue is whether the statute interferes 
with the president's power to recognize an 
independent sovereign. 
The case is a classic fight between 
congressional and executive authority, with 
foreign policy the source of the current 
controversy. 
U.S. policy does not recognize any country 
as having sovereignty over Jerusalem. Two 
years ago, the justices allowed the family's 
federal lawsuit to proceed. 
The city is home to Ari and Naomi 
Zivotofsky. The couple and their two oldest 
children were born in the United States, but 
the family migrated to West Jerusalem more 
than a dozen years ago, and in 2002 the 
youngest, Menachem Binyamin, was born. 
The boy's mother made the "Israel" request 
about two months after his birth, but 
embassy officials refused. The disputed 
passport shows his round, innocent face, and 
"Jerusalem" is listed as his place of birth. 
"We're very proud of the fact that he was 
born in Israel and that we live in Israel and 
it's the modern state of Israel," Ari 
Zivotofsky told CNN in 2012. "Religiously 
and historically, that's very significant." 
Just three weeks before Menachem was 
born, the U.S. Congress gave American 
citizens born in Jerusalem the individual 
discretion to ask that Israel be listed on 
passports and consular reports, where it says 
"Place of Birth." President George W. Bush 
signed the bill but issued an executive 
"signing statement" indicating he would not 
comply. 
It is not the first time Congress and the 
White House have clashed over the region. 
The U.S. Embassy remains in Tel Aviv, over 
U.S. lawmakers' objections. 
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The government is thinking of the bigger 
picture. State Department officials would 
not comment on the record on a pending 
case, but President Barack Obama has 
acknowledged the stalled peace process has 
created divisions in that region and in the 
United States. 
The high court case is Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 
but the key player in this dispute is perhaps 
the most famous city in the world, and one 
of the oldest human settlements still in 
existence: Jerusalem. Its name translates as 
"City of Peace" to some, "Holy Sanctuary" 
to others. Jerusalem is Israel's largest city, 
and the nation calls it its capital, though that 
is not recognized by the United Nations and 
most of the world community. 
Divided into East Jerusalem (populated 
mostly by Muslims) and West Jerusalem 
(populated mostly by Jews), the city spans 
over 48 square miles (124 square 
kilometers), with about 775,000 people. 
The terms "East" and "West" come layered 
with political, social, religious and 
geographic questions -- amorphous, often 
misleading terms, symbolic of the larger 
struggle for control and recognition of all 
that this city represents. Some use the terms 
"Jewish" or "Arab" Jerusalem to refer to the 
sections. 
The Old City is the heart of the region, a 
holy symbol to the three major Abrahamic 
religions: Christianity, Islam and Judaism. 
That tiny area -- just a third of one square 
mile -- contains the Temple Mount, Western 
Wall, Church of the Holy Sepulcher, Dome 
of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque. 
The case is Zivotofsky v. Kerry (13-628). 
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“Court Bars 'Jerusalem, Israel' as Birthplace on American Passports” 
LA Times 
Alexei Koseff 
July 23, 2013 
American citizens born in Jerusalem cannot 
claim Israel as their place of birth on their 
passports, a federal appeals court in 
Washington ruled Tuesday. 
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
unanimously declared unconstitutional a 
2002 law that required the State Department 
to record Israel as the birthplace of 
Jerusalem-born citizens despite a long-
standing position in the executive branch of 
strict neutrality toward sovereignty of the 
disputed city. 
At stake in the case was a question of 
governmental authority over foreign policy: 
Does the president have the sole right to 
decide on what terms foreign nations are 
recognized? 
Though the United States has recognized the 
sovereignty of Israel since it declared 
independence in 1948, no president has ever 
taken a position on Jerusalem. Israel 
considers the city its political and spiritual 
capital, while Palestinians seek to make East 
Jerusalem the capital of a future country. 
The case was brought by the family of 
Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, now 10, 
born to American parents in Jerusalem. 
When his mother applied for a passport for 
him with the birthplace as "Jerusalem, 
Israel," the U.S. Consulate listed only 
"Jerusalem." 
Zivotofsky was born weeks after Congress 
passed the passport provision in September 
2002 as part of a foreign relations 
appropriations bill. 
But when President George W. Bush signed 
the law, he issued an executive statement 
asserting that the policy on Jerusalem, if 
construed as mandatory rather than advisory, 
would "impermissibly interfere" with the 
president's constitutional authority in 
matters of foreign affairs. 
The Secretary of State has never enforced 
the policy, arguing that it intrudes upon 
presidential powers. 
The Court of Appeals agreed in its ruling, 
stating that the law was a political act that 
infringed upon the president's exclusive 
recognition power in the Constitution. 
The law "is not, as Zivotofsky asserts, 
legislation that simply — and neutrally — 
regulates the form and content of a 
passport," Circuit Judge Karen Henderson 
wrote in her opinion. "Congress plainly 
intended to force the State Department to 
deviate from its decades-long position of 
neutrality" toward Jerusalem. 
Several groups swiftly decried the decision. 
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The Anti-Defamation League, which 
combats anti-Semitism, wrote in a statement 
that it was "deeply disappointed" by the 
news. 
"The court has effectively given a stamp of 
approval to the offensive State Department 
policy that singles out Israel for 'special' 
treatment," it wrote. 
In a statement, the Orthodox Union, an 
umbrella group of Orthodox Jewish 
congregations, called Jerusalem "the eternal 
and indivisible capital of the State of Israel" 
and said it would support an appeal of the 
ruling to the Supreme Court. 
Congress has long demanded recognition of 
Israel's sovereign control over Jerusalem. In 
1995, it passed a law requiring that the 
United States move its embassy from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem, an act that has since been 
suspended on a semiannual basis by the 
president for national security reasons. 
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NEW TOPIC: CONGRESS & THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 
“Supreme Court Rebukes Obama on Right of Appointment” 
New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
June 26, 2014 
The Supreme Court issued a unanimous 
rebuke to President Obama on Thursday, 
saying he had overreached in issuing recess 
appointments during brief breaks in the 
Senate’s work. 
Mr. Obama violated the Constitution in 
2012, the justices said, by appointing 
officials to the National Labor Relations 
Board during a break in the Senate’s work 
when the chamber was convening every 
three days in short pro forma sessions in 
which no business was conducted. Those 
breaks were too short, Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer wrote in a majority opinion joined by 
the court’s four other more liberal members. 
At the same time, the court largely reinstated 
an uneasy, centuries-long accommodation 
between the executive branch and the 
Senate, in which recess appointments were 
allowed during more substantial breaks. 
Justice Breyer said such appointments 
generally remained permissible so long as 
they were made during breaks of 10 or more 
days. 
Although there may be few immediate 
practical consequences of the ruling, given 
the recent overhaul of the Senate’s filibuster 
rules, the decision was nonetheless 
momentous, involving a constitutional 
adjudication of the balance of power 
between the president and the Senate. 
Just how to strike that balance was the 
subject of a heated dispute between the 
court’s more liberal members and its more 
conservative ones. 
The practical impact of the ruling over time 
“remains to be seen,” Justice Antonin Scalia 
said in a concurrence. Many experts say that 
if either house of Congress is controlled by 
the party opposed to the president, 
lawmakers can effectively block recess 
appointments by requiring pro forma 
sessions every three days. The Constitution 
says that each house must get the approval 
of the other chamber to adjourn for more 
than three days. 
But Justice Scalia was skeptical, noting that 
the president had the constitutional power to 
set adjournments when the chambers 
disagreed. 
What was certain, he said, was that the court 
had endorsed a vast expansion of executive 
power. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and 
Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. 
Alito Jr. joined the concurrence, which was 
caustic and despairing. 
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“The court’s decision transforms the recess-
appointment power from a tool carefully 
designed to fill a narrow and specific need,” 
Justice Scalia wrote, “into a weapon to be 
wielded by future presidents against future 
Senates.” 
If it was hard to assess the immediate 
consequences, there was no question that 
Mr. Obama narrowly avoided a far broader 
loss, one that could have limited recess 
appointments to breaks between Congress’s 
formal annual sessions, and even then to 
vacancies that arose during those breaks. 
That was the approach embraced by the 
court’s four most conservative members. 
“The majority practically bends over 
backwards to ensure that recess 
appointments will remain a powerful 
weapon in the president’s arsenal,” Justice 
Scalia said from the bench. 
The decision affirmed a broad ruling last 
year by a federal appeals court in 
Washington that had called into question the 
constitutionality of many recess 
appointments by presidents of both parties. 
But the Supreme Court majority rejected the 
appeals court’s reading of the constitutional 
text, relying instead on historical practices 
and pragmatic considerations. 
Josh Earnest, the White House Press 
Secretary, expressed dismay and satisfaction 
in equal measure. “We’re of course deeply 
disappointed in today’s decision,” he said. 
But Mr. Earnest added that the White House 
was “pleased that the court recognized the 
president’s executive authority as exercised 
by presidents going all the way back to 
George Washington.” 
Miguel Estrada, a lawyer for Senator Mitch 
McConnell of Kentucky, the Republican 
leader, said the decision was a victory for 
the Senate and the separation of powers. 
“The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Senate’s 
power to prescribe its own rules, including 
the right to determine for itself when it is in 
session, and rejected the president’s 
completely unprecedented assertion of 
unilateral appointment power,” he said. 
The issue of recess appointments and what 
they are meant to accomplish — installing a 
controversial nominee by circumventing the 
confirmation process — is largely a moot 
one on Capitol Hill. Because Senate 
Democrats late last year changed the rules 
governing how nominees are approved and 
made it far easier for the president to get his 
officials confirmed, there is not much need 
for a recess appointment for now. 
The Constitution’s recess-appointments 
clause says, “The president shall have power 
to fill up all vacancies that may happen 
during the recess of the Senate.” 
Analyzing that language, a three-judge panel 
of the appeals court said that presidents may 
bypass the Senate only during the recesses 
between formal sessions of Congress. Two 
of the judges went further, saying that 
presidents may fill only vacancies that came 
up during that same recess. 
The case arose from a labor dispute 
involving a soft-drink bottling company, 
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Noel Canning. The labor board ruled against 
the company, saying it had engaged in an 
unfair labor practice by refusing to enter into 
a collective bargaining agreement. 
The company appealed, arguing that the 
labor board had been powerless to rule 
because a majority of its members had been 
appointed during a 20-day stretch when the 
Senate was convening every three days in 
pro forma sessions without conducting 
business. Mr. Obama, who viewed the 
sessions as a tactic to keep the Senate open 
so he could not make recess appointments, 
made the appointments anyway. 
Since three members of the board — Sharon 
Block, Terence F. Flynn and Richard F. 
Griffin Jr. — had not been properly 
appointed, the company argued, its ruling 
was void. 
In asking the Supreme Court to review the 
appeals court’s ruling in the case, National 
Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, No. 
12-1281, the Obama administration sought 
answers to only the broader questions 
decided by the appeals court. But the 
Supreme Court agreed to answer a narrower 
question, too: whether the president may 
make recess appointments when the Senate 
is convening every three days in pro forma 
sessions. 
That was the question on which the 
administration lost. 
The board issued 436 decisions during the 
18 months when Mr. Obama’s improperly 
appointed employees worked there. Gregory 
J. King, a spokesman for the labor board, 
said there remained about 100 cases on hold 
in federal appeals courts awaiting a Supreme 
Court decision about the legitimacy of the 
recess appointees. In those cases, the 
appellants are challenging decisions from 
when the board had the contested 
appointees; they assert that the board did not 
have a legitimate quorum to issue those 
decisions. 
The great majority of those board decisions 
may be negated by Thursday’s ruling by the 
Supreme Court. At the request of the 
litigants, many of those cases will be 
returned to — and reviewed by — the 
current board, which has a full contingent of 
five members duly confirmed by the Senate. 
Because the board has a 3-2 Democratic 
majority, the current board is likely to affirm 
nearly all or all of the rulings, legal experts 
said. 
Both sides in Thursday’s decision relied 
heavily on history. Justice Breyer noted 
many examples of recess appointments 
made during formal sessions of the Senate, 
some of which filled vacancies that had 
arisen before the break in question. “Justice 
Scalia would render illegitimate thousands 
of recess appointments reaching all the way 
back to the founding era,” Justice Breyer 
wrote. 
But he added that the earlier breaks were not 
as brief as the ones at issue. “We have not 
found a single example of a recess 
appointment made during an intra-session 
recess that was shorter than 10 days,” Justice 
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Breyer wrote in explaining why the court 
had adopted that criterion. 
The 10-day rule was not absolute, he added, 
as a national emergency might require faster 
action. But he said that “political opposition 
in the Senate would not qualify as an 
unusual circumstance.” 
Justice Scalia said all of this was arbitrary. 
“These new rules have no basis whatsoever 
in the Constitution,” he said from the bench. 
“They are just made up.” 
“What the majority needs to sustain its 
judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear 
historical practice,” he wrote. “What it has is 
clear text and an at-best-ambiguous 
historical practice.” 
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“The Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision and the NLRB’s Response” 
Mondaq 
Mark L. Shapiro, David Santeusanio & Brian M. Doyle 
July 17, 2014 
 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a 
decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals on June 26, 2014, invalidating 
President Obama's appointment in January 
2012 of three members to the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "board"). 
National Labor Relations Board v. Noel 
Canning, No. 12-1281 (June 26, 2014). The 
decision raises uncertainty concerning the 
validity of NLRB decisions, rulings and 
administrative actions issued since President 
Obama made the appointments. Since the 
Supreme Court's decision, NLRB has taken 
quick action to address the decision, 
including setting aside certain board 
decisions on appeal to the federal circuit 
courts and filing motions in other cases 
asking the courts to vacate and remand the 
cases to the board. This alert describes the 
Supreme Court's decision and the NLRB's 
initial response. 
Noel Canning Case Background 
The Noel Canning Corporation, a 
Washington state bottling company, first 
raised the issue of the authority of the recess 
appointments in connection with its defense 
of an unfair labor practices charge. The 
NLRB concluded that Noel Canning 
committed an unfair labor practice, and Noel 
Canning appealed the decision to the D.C. 
Circuit, arguing that the board lacked the 
authority to issue the ruling because it was 
not comprised of constitutionally appointed 
board members. At that time, the board 
consisted of three members appointed by 
President Obama in January 2012 pursuant 
to the Recess Appointments Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
In January 2013, the D.C. Circuit issued its 
decision in Noel Canning v. NLRB, ruling 
that President Obama's "recess 
appointments" to the NLRB were 
unconstitutional. The court concluded that 
the three "recess" appointments made by the 
president in January 2012 were invalid on 
two grounds. 
• First, the court held that recess 
appointments may only be made during the 
recess between each session of Congress (an 
intersession recess, which happens only 
once per year), rather than on a break in 
Congress that occurs while Congress is still 
in session (an intrasession recess, which 
occurs rather frequently, such as during 
holidays). 
• Second, the court held that recess 
appointments can be made to fill only those 
positions that become vacant during the 
recess, such that the president cannot make 
recess appointments to fill preexisting or 
long-standing vacancies. The NLRB 
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, 
which issued its unanimous decision on June 
26, 2014, affirming the opinion of the D.C. 
Circuit. 
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The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. 
Circuit's judgment, but its reasoning was 
different. 
• First, and contrary to the D.C. 
Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court held 
that the Recess Appointments Clause 
empowers the president to fill any existing 
vacancy during any recess of sufficient 
length – regardless of whether it is 
intrasession or intersession. 
• Second, and also contrary to the D.C. 
Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court held 
that the phrase "vacancies that may happen 
during the recess of the Senate" includes 
both vacancies that arise while the Senate is 
in recess and vacancies that already exist at 
the time the Senate goes into recess. 
Despite disagreeing with the reasoning of 
the D.C. Circuit's opinion, the Supreme 
Court ultimately affirmed the decision on a 
separate basis. The Supreme Court 
concluded that for purposes of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, the Senate is in 
session when it says that it is, provided that, 
under its own rules, the Senate is able to 
conduct Senate business. However, the 
Senate was not, in fact, in a "recess" when 
the president invoked the Recess 
Appointments Clause in January 2012. 
Instead, the Senate had passed a resolution 
providing for a series of pro forma sessions 
in which it decided that it would not transact 
any business, although, as the Supreme 
Court concluded, it remained capable of 
doing so. The president made his 
appointments during a three-day break 
between two of the pro forma sessions, 
which the Supreme Court ruled was 
presumptively too short a period of time to 
bring the recess within the scope of the 
Recess Appointments Clause. 
Impact on Board Decisions and the 
NLRB's Response 
The Supreme Court's decision has an 
immediate impact in favor of Noel Canning, 
which invalidates the adverse board decision 
finding that Noel Canning engaged in an 
unfair labor practice. The decision also has 
an immediate impact on the board decisions 
– including high-profile and controversial 
decisions – that the board decided between 
Jan. 4, 2012 (the day of the recess 
appointments), and Aug. 5, 2013 (the day 
the Senate confirmed nominations for the 
three board positions). Many of those cases 
are currently working their way through the 
federal court system. As for those board 
decisions that are not currently pending in 
federal court, it is not immediately clear how 
this decision will affect those proceedings. 
Since the Supreme Court's decision, NLRB 
has taken steps in response. On the day the 
Supreme Court decided the case, NLRB 
Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce issued a 
statement saying that the board is "analyzing 
the impact that the Court's decision has on 
Board cases in which the January 2012 
recess appointees participated." He further 
stated that the board "is committed to 
resolving any cases affected by today's 
decision as expeditiously as possible." 
Then, at a July 9, 2014, ABA webinar, 
NLRB General Counsel Richard Griffin 
explained the actions the board had taken in 
response to the decision. He stated that in 
the federal appeals courts, there were 98 
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cases involving the recess appointees. In 43 
of those cases, the board had not yet filed 
the records of NLRB proceedings. Section 
10(d) of the National Labor Relations Act 
states that until the record of the case is filed 
in the court, "the Board may at any time, 
upon reasonable notice and in such manner 
as it deems proper, modify or set aside, in 
whole or in part, any findings or order made 
or issued by it." Griffin explained that under 
Section 10(d), the NLRB will modify or set 
aside the orders in those cases. Of the 
remaining 55 cases (in which the board 
record has already been filed with the court), 
the board has filed motions in 49 of the 
cases asking the court to vacate and remand 
the cases to the board. 
Griffin further explained that other cases 
affected by the Noel Canning decision had 
not proceeded to the court of appeals. Of 
those cases, the general counsel may seek to 
return some of those cases to the NLRB or, 
if the parties have no interest in having the 
NLRB further address the dispute (because 
for example, the dispute was resolved), the 
cases would not return to the board and no 
further action would be taken. He also 
explained that the board is still addressing 
the issue of the board's appointment of 
regional directors and the validity of their 
actions. The board will continue to address 
the short-term and long-term consequences 
of the Noel Canning decision. 
The decision and the board's initial response 
show the complexities and administrative 
burdens associated with this issue. This is 
not the first time that the board has 
confronted a similar issue. After the 
Supreme Court's decision in New Process 
Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, in which the Court 
concluded that the board lacked authority to 
issue decisions without a quorum of at least 
three members, the board simply re-issued 
the decisions that were previously rendered 
by a delegated two-member panel, after it 
obtained quorum. Given the composition of 
the current board – three pro-labor members 
on a five-member board – it is likely that 
any decisions revisited by the board will be 
affirmed. 
Questions Remain About the Validity of 
Other NLRB Actions 
Practically, many of the board's decisions 
have resulted in orders that have already 
been implemented for over two years, 
including the negotiations of contracts and 
the hiring of workers. It would be difficult to 
undo what has already been done. But the 
Supreme Court's decision raises questions as 
to the validity of other actions taken by the 
board, including the appointment of those 
regional directors who were appointed 
during the relevant time and the 
promulgation of new rules. In addition, there 
may be arguments that decisions rendered 
by a regional director appointed by an 
unconstitutional board are also invalid. 
Given the administrative burdens associated 
with addressing the effects of the Noel 
Canning decision, case backlogs and related 
delays will likely occur at NLRB in the near 
future. 
Although the Supreme Court's decision has 
provided clarity to Noel Canning and 
resulted in immediate action by NLRB in 
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those cases currently pending in federal 
court, there remain questions that employers 
should assess with counsel concerning the 
reach of the decision. There is also the 
political question of what happens the next 
time there is a vacancy on the board and 
opposite parties control the White House 
and the Senate. The next board vacancy will 
occur on Dec. 16, 2014 (when the term of 
Democrat member Nancy Schiffer will 
expire), leaving a two-two split between 
Democratic and Republican board members. 
In connection with that upcoming vacancy, 
President Obama on July 10, 2014, re-
nominated Democrat Sharon Block, one of 
the three recess appointments invalidated by 
the Noel Canning decision. Political 
maneuvering on the vacancy, coupled with 
the current fallout of the Noel Canning 
decision, will likely continue to affect the 
NLRB.  
To ensure compliance with Treasury 
Regulations, we inform you that any tax 
advice contained in this correspondence was 
not intended or written by us to be used, and 
cannot be used by you or anyone else, for 
the purpose of avoiding penalties imposed 
by the Internal Revenue Code. 
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“Counsel Rests” 
Slate 
Neal Devins 
January 13, 2014 
At oral arguments Monday on President 
Obama’s recess appointment power, Senate 
Republicans locked horns with Obama’s 
Department of Justice. The Office of Senate 
Legal Counsel is not participating in the suit, 
even though it involves the Senate directly. 
Instead, the justices agreed to a request by 
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to 
participate in the oral argument.  
Last year, it was House Republicans locking 
horns with the Obama Justice Department. 
In defending the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act before the 
Supreme Court, the House Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group actually spoke only for 
House Republicans. Indeed, 132 House 
Democrats filed an amicus brief in that 
appeal, arguing both that DOMA was 
unconstitutional and that the House counsel 
did not “speak for a unanimous House on 
this issue.” 
In Monday’s recess appointment case, why 
would the Senate’s own lawyer sit on his 
hands while the minority leader purports to 
speak for the Senate? And why were House 
Republicans Congress’s only voice in oral 
arguments in the DOMA case? The answer 
lies in the differences in the ways the House 
and Senate can participate in litigation—
differences exacerbated by the polarization 
of Democrats and Republicans in both the 
House and Senate. 
The Office of Senate Legal Counsel can 
only participate in litigation with broad 
bipartisan support. By statute, counsel 
representation of the Senate requires two-
thirds support of a leadership group made up 
of four members of the majority party and 
three members of the minority party. This 
supermajority requirement made perfect 
sense back when the office was created in 
1978.  Reflecting both Senate norms 
favoring bipartisanship and Senate desires to 
defend its institutional prerogatives in the 
wake of Watergate, the Office of Senate 
Legal Counsel was created to speak the 
Senate’s collective voice in disputes with the 
executive branch. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Office of Senate 
Legal Counsel defended the constitutionality 
of federal statutes in several high-profile 
disputes with the executive branch. In cases 
involving the constitutionality of the 
legislative veto, deficit-reduction legislation, 
independent counsel investigations of high-
ranking executive officials, and race 
preferences in broadcasting, the Senate 
counsel defended Congress’ institutional 
prerogatives before the Supreme Court. In 
some of these cases, Republican Ronald 
Reagan was president, and the Senate 
majority was also Republican. In other 
words, 1980s Republicans were willing to 
stand up to a Republican president to 
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advance the institutional interests of the 
Senate. 
The recess appointment appeal being heard 
Monday is precisely the type of case 
Congress had in mind when it created the 
Office of Senate Legal Counsel. The case 
concerns the president’s power to fill 
vacancies in the executive or judicial 
branches, when the Senate is “in recess”—
and thus unable to hold a confirmation 
hearing. The president, not surprisingly, has 
a broad view of what constitutes a Senate 
recess—to curb restraints on his power to 
make recess appointments. In the abstract, 
the Senate would be expected to have a 
somewhat narrower view of what constitutes 
a recess—so as to expand its own role in 
confirmations. But in today’s polarized 
Congress, Democrats and Republicans did 
not come together to assert a shared 
institutional view of what might constitute a 
Senate recess. In particular, whereas Senate 
Republicans are eager to assert their 
institutional prerogatives against the 
president, Senate Democrats seem altogether 
unwilling to challenge Obama’s efforts to 
use recess appointments to get his nominees 
through the Senate. 
The inability of Senate Republicans and 
Democrats to come together is not 
completely new. Since the 1995 Republican 
takeover of Congress, the Senate counsel 
has not participated in a single case in which 
the Department of Justice has refused to 
defend a federal statute. Indeed, I am aware 
of no recent Senate–executive branch 
dispute in which the Senate counsel has 
gone to court to assert Senate prerogatives. 
Instead, reflecting ever-increasing party 
polarization in Congress, the Senate counsel 
has been absolutely unable to speak with a 
bipartisan voice in disputes with the 
executive. In a 1993 lawsuit over a recess 
appointment by then–lame duck President 
George H.W. Bush, minority party Senate 
Republicans blocked the filing of a brief that 
would have defended the Senate’s 
confirmation power. 
The recess appointment case currently 
before the Supreme Court takes matters one 
step further. Instead of simply blocking 
participation by the Senate counsel, Senate 
Republicans banded together to defend 
Senate prerogatives by limiting the scope of 
presidential recess appointments. Ironically, 
these same Senate Republicans set in motion 
the very dispute now before the court. 
Following a practice utilized by Senate 
Democrats during the George W. Bush 
administration, Senate Republicans sought 
to block Obama recess appointments to the 
National Labor Relations Board and other 
government agencies by making use of so-
called pro forma sessions—minutelong 
sessions where a single lawmaker would 
periodically gavel the Senate into session 
during a break. In January 2012, President 
Obama, claiming that the Senate was in 
recess during one of these pro forma 
sessions, made three recess appointments to 
the NLRB. For the Obama administration, 
these pro forma sessions were intended to 
disrupt the constitutional balance of powers 
between Senate and president; Senate 
Republicans, instead, argue that the 
president is simply seeking to “evade the 
advice and consent protocol at his pleasure.” 
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That the justices will hear only from the 
Senate minority and not from the Senate 
itself is truly unfortunate. The case, of 
course, has extremely serious implications 
for the balance of power between the 
president and Senate. Given the recent fights 
over the appointments process and the use of 
the nuclear option, the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of the real-world dynamic 
between the Senate and president on recess 
appointments might impact its final ruling in 
the case. The fact that the Supreme Court 
will hear only from the Senate minority 
could shape the court’s understanding of this 
dynamic.  
And even if that is not the case, it is 
certainly true that the justices will not know 
whether the Senate itself thought it was in 
session at the time of these appointments. 
When the case was argued in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, circuit judge and former Senate 
counsel Thomas Griffith lamented the fact 
that Senate counsel did not participate for 
this very reason. As Griffith put it at the 
time, “How do we know what the Senate’s 
view is about the meaning of recess in terms 
of the recess appointments clause? We 
don’t.” 
When it comes to the House, majority rules. 
The House counsel essentially works for the 
speaker of the House. The so-called 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group that 
authorizes House counsel action is largely a 
sham. In the DOMA case, for example, 
BLAG divided along strictly partisan lines 
to authorize House intervention in the case. 
Likewise, BLAG divided along partisan 
lines in 2000 when defending a federal 
statute overturning Miranda v. Arizona.  
In both cases, Democratic members filed 
competing briefs to make clear that the 
House BLAG was both wrong on the merits 
and spoke only for the majority party. 
BLAG’s own filings likewise acknowledged 
that it represented only the views of the 
majority party, stating that although it 
“seeks consensus whenever possible, it 
functions on a majoritarian basis, like the 
institution it represents.” 
Differences between today’s House and 
Senate are also revealed in the willingness 
for the House, but not the Senate, to go to 
court to assert its institutional prerogatives 
against the executive. With House rules 
allowing a simple majority to invoke both 
the contempt power and the filing of 
lawsuits by the House counsel, the House is 
likely to be a vigorous proponent for 
congressional prerogatives when the 
opposition party controls the White House. 
In an ongoing dispute between the House 
and Attorney General Eric Holder about the 
“Fast and Furious” gun-running operation, 
the Republican majority is seeking judicial 
enforcement of a subpoena against the 
attorney general. During the George W. 
Bush administration, Democrats were in the 
majority and similarly sought judicial 
enforcement of subpoenas in a 2007 dispute 
over the firing of U.S. attorneys. 
Party polarization and House-Senate 
differences are now a fact of life and, 
apparently, so is the strange spectacle of the 
Supreme Court hearing oral arguments from 
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the House majority in the DOMA case and 
the Senate minority in the recess 
appointment case. Indeed, the bipartisanship 
requirement that now makes it impossible 
for the Senate counsel to participate in 
litigation that divides the parties is 
statutorily mandated, from a time when we 
could imagine a Senate that could 
sometimes agree.  
It is even more urgent, therefore, that the 
justices hearing the recess appointments 
case recognize that they are only hearing 
from the Senate minority —not the House, 
not the Senate, and certainly not the entire 
Congress. 
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“House Votes to Authorize Boehner to Sue Obama” 
Wall Street Journal 
Michael R. Crittenden & Colleen McCain Nelson 
July 20, 2014 
 House lawmakers voted Wednesday to 
authorize Speaker John Boehner to file suit 
against President Barack Obama on a 
complaint that he had overstepped his legal 
authority, setting up a possible constitutional 
test and giving both parties a potent 
campaign issue to take home for the five-
week congressional recess. 
In a 225-201 vote, the House told Mr. 
Boehner (R., Ohio) to move ahead with the 
suit. House GOP leaders have said they 
would focus the suit on the White House's 
decision last year to give employers a one-
year reprieve on enforcing a requirement 
under the Affordable Care Act that they 
offer health coverage or pay a penalty. The 
requirement was delayed until 2015, and the 
White House then revised the health law 
further by saying employers with between 
50 and 99 full-time workers wouldn't have 
to comply or pay a fee until 2016. 
Five Republicans joined Democrats in 
voting against pursuing the lawsuit. No 
Democrats voted to move forward with the 
suit. 
Mr. Boehner, speaking just before the vote, 
said Congress needed to assert its authority 
under the Constitution to combat executive 
overreach. "This isn't about Republicans and 
Democrats. It's about defending the 
Constitution we swore an oath to uphold," 
he said. 
Mr. Obama, speaking to a friendly crowd in 
Kansas City ahead of the vote, said that 
suing him wasn't a productive thing to do. 
"Everybody recognizes this is a political 
stunt," he said of the lawsuit. "But it's worse 
than that, because every vote they're taking 
like that means a vote they're not taking to 
actually help you." 
The legal and political fallout from the 
decision to pursue the lawsuit remains 
largely unclear. Many legal experts have 
questioned whether the courts would take up 
such a suit, suggesting that lawyers 
representing the House could face 
significant hurdles. 
A court could question whether the House 
has met the standard of showing that it has 
been harmed by the president's actions, 
particularly because lawmakers are suing 
him for not enforcing a law they have 
repeatedly sought to repeal. Another 
question is whether the House, in acting 
without the Senate, has standing to sue the 
White House. 
Moreover, said College of William and 
Mary law professor Tara Grove, courts have 
repeatedly avoided arbitrating political 
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disputes between the executive and 
legislative branches. 
"We're in uncharted waters, and I think any 
judicial court would want to avoid weighing 
in," Ms. Grove said. "I'd be very surprised if 
the court grants standing." 
Proponents of a suit have argued there is 
precedent for the legislative branch suing the 
executive, and that lawmakers can argue that 
they have been harmed by the White 
House's taking away their constitutional 
authority to legislate. 
Candidates from both parties are likely to 
use the suit as a political touchstone as they 
head to their districts this week to campaign 
ahead of the midterm elections. Republicans 
who have long criticized the White House 
and Mr. Obama for executive overreach on 
issues such as immigration and the health 
law plan to use the suit to show their base 
that they are resolved to rein in the 
president. 
"While there is at least one political branch 
willing to enforce the law, we will not fail to 
act through whatever means of which we 
can successfully avail ourselves," Rep. Bob 
Goodlatte (R., Va.), chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, said during floor 
debate. 
Democrats say the lawsuit helps them make 
the argument to voters that Republicans care 
more about attacking Mr. Obama than 
legislating. "While it was intended to rev up 
their base, it has had the unintended 
consequence of revving up ours," Rep. Steve 
Israel (D., N.Y.), who heads the House 
Democrats' campaign arm, said in an 
interview. 
The Democratic Congressional Campaign 
Committee has been bringing up the lawsuit, 
and asserting that the GOP-led House plans 
to impeach Mr. Obama, while asking for 
donations. The group raised $1 million on 
Monday alone, and a total of $7.6 million 
since Mr. Boehner first announced the 
lawsuit in late June. 
The lawsuit has led to increasingly 
contentious exchanges between the White 
House and House Republican leaders, 
particularly over whether the lawsuit is a 
prelude to the House seeking to impeach Mr. 
Obama. Mr. Boehner on Tuesday said any 
talk of impeachment was a "scam" started 
by the White House. "They are trying to 
rally their people to give money and show 
up in this year's election," Mr. Boehner said. 
While Mr. Boehner had said there are no 
plans to seek impeachment, some more 
conservative lawmakers have suggested it 
remains an option. 
The House GOP lawsuit isn't the only new 
legal challenge facing the Obama 
administration. On Tuesday, West Virginia 
filed suit against the administration, 
challenging its decision to allow insurance 
commissioners to choose whether to let 
insurers temporarily to continue to sell 
policies that don't comply with the 
Affordable Care Act. 
The suit, filed against the Department of 
Health and Human Services in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, 
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argues that the extension allowing state 
insurance commissioners to reinstate such 
policies placed a burden on the states. 
West Virginia Attorney General Patrick 
Morrisey said the delay in cancellations 
shifted political accountability and 
discretion over enforcement of certain 
federal laws to the states. "The president 
cannot pick and choose which laws to 
follow and which to ignore on the basis of 
political convenience," Mr. Morrisey said. 
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“Constitution Check: Could the House Sue the President for Refusing to 
Carry Out the Laws?” 
Constitution Daily 
Lyle Denniston 
June 24, 2014 
 THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE: 
“Presidents must exercise some discretion in 
interpreting laws, must have some latitude in 
allocating finite resources to the 
enforcement of laws and must have some 
freedom to act in the absence of law. 
Obama, however, has perpetrated more than 
40 suspensions of laws. Were presidents the 
sole judges of the limits of their latitude, 
they would effectively have plenary power 
to vitiate the separation of powers, the 
Founders’ bulwark against despotism.   
Congress cannot reverse egregious executive 
aggressions such as Obama’s without robust 
judicial assistance. … It would be perverse 
for the courts to adhere to a doctrine of 
congressional standing so strict that it 
precludes judicial defense of the separation 
of powers.” 
– Syndicated columnist George F. Will, in 
The Washington Post on June 22, praising 
efforts in the House of Representatives to 
pass legislation that would allow the House 
to sue President Obama with a claim that he 
is unconstitutionally refusing to carry out 
laws passed by Congress. By “congressional 
standing” he meant the right to file a 
lawsuit. 
“Obama has worked around Congress with 
breathtaking audacity… So much for the 
separation of powers. In a desperate attempt 
to stem the hemorrhaging of legislative 
power, members of Congress are turning to 
the court to enforce their constitutional 
prerogative.” 
WE CHECKED THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND… 
The Constitution has nothing to say about 
ways to cure the kind of gridlock that now 
exists in the national government in 
Washington. There is frustration in the 
White House as President Obama finds 
himself unable to get much of his legislative 
program through Congress, and there is 
frustration in Congress – especially in the 
Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives – whenever the President 
takes unilateral action to put some of his 
policies into effect without legislative 
approval. 
Neither side seems willing to yield, and the 
Constitution – based as it is on the benign 
assumption that those in national leadership 
will always find ways to govern, more or 
less successfully – has no specific provision 
to force compromise.   The checks-and-
balances written into the division of 
government powers can turn out to barriers 
to action, especially in circumstances like 
those that now prevail in the nation’s capital. 
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It is perhaps tempting to think, as the 
commentary by columnist George Will 
suggests, that this is a problem that ought to 
be handed over to the courts: get them 
involved to enforce the lines of demarcation 
between what Congress does and what 
presidents are allowed to do. 
However, there is, and has long been, a 
constitutional barrier to the courts acting as 
an arbiter of inter-branch disputes between 
Congress and the White House.   Its origin is 
in the Constitution’s Article III, and its 
meaning comes from the way the courts 
have interpreted the limitation spelled out 
there.   “The judicial power,” it says, “shall 
extend to all cases…and controversies.”   A 
“case or controversy” means, in this context, 
a live lawsuit, with those on each side 
having something genuinely in dispute, and 
that something is capable of being decided 
by the use of rules of law. 
The courts, in short, will not decide mere 
abstract legal controversies, and they will 
not hand out advisory opinions on how the 
laws or the Constitution are to be 
interpreted. Courts have a number of ways 
of showing respect for those restrictions on 
their power, and one of them is to refuse to 
decide what is called a “political question.”   
In this sense, “political” does not mean a 
partisan issue; it means an issue that the 
courts find has to be decided, if it is decided 
at all, only by the “political” branches: 
Congress and the Executive Branch. 
Time after time, when members of Congress 
have sued in the courts, because the 
Executive Branch did something that they 
believe frustrated the will of Congress, they 
have been met at the door of the courthouse 
with a polite refusal to let them in. Failing to 
get their way in the skirmishing with the 
White House does not give members of 
Congress a right to take their grievance into 
court. Frustration does not make a real 
lawsuit, according to this notion. 
Some lawyers and scholars, however, have 
from time to time wondered if this situation 
has to continue unchanged. Since the 
Constitution also gives to Congress the 
authority to define the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, what cases they can and 
cannot decide, why couldn’t Congress just 
pass a law declaring that one house or some 
of the members of Congress do have a right 
to sue the President over a legitimate inter-
branch dispute, in order to protect the 
legislative prerogative of that part of the 
government? Wouldn’t that work to get such 
a lawsuit past the door of the courthouse? 
It is a plausible argument, and columnist 
George Will found it entirely persuasive in 
the column quoted above. There is a catch, 
though: expanding the jurisdiction of the 
courts to hear what are, at their core, 
political disputes would still be an attempt to 
create a “case or controversy” that satisfied 
Article III’s requirements.   In other words, 
the constitutionality of such an expansion of 
court authority would itself be a 
constitutional issue that the courts would 
have the authority to decide. 
The courts can be jealous guardians of their 
notion of what the Constitution allows, or 
does not allow, in terms of judicial review. 
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The resistance to resolving political disputes 
is quite deeply set.  One might suggest that it 
would take an inter-branch controversy of 
monumental proportions to cause them to 
give up that reluctance. Is the feud over 
President Obama’s use of his White House 
powers of that dimension? That may well be 
debatable. 
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“The Supreme Court’s Powerful New Consensus” 
New York Times 
Neal K. Katyal 
June 26, 2014 
For years, particularly after the 2000 
election, talk about the Supreme Court has 
centered on its bitter 5-to-4 divisions.  Yet it 
is worth reflecting on a remarkable 
achievement: The Court has agreed 
unanimously in more than 66 percent of its 
cases this term (and that figure holds even if 
Monday’s remaining two cases, on the 
Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive 
coverage and on public-sector unions, are 
not unanimous).  The last year this happened 
was 1940. 
The justices’ ability to cross partisan divides 
and find common ground in their bottom-
line judgment in roughly two-thirds of their 
cases — including the two decisions handed 
down Thursday, restricting the president’s 
ability to issue recess appointments during 
brief breaks in the Senate’s work, and 
striking down a Massachusetts ban on 
protests near abortion clinics — should 
remind us that even in this hyperpartisan 
age, there is a difference between law and 
politics. 
Unanimity is important because it signals 
that the justices can rise above their 
differences and interpret the law without 
partisanship. The best illustration of this in 
the modern era is Brown v. Board of 
Education, in which the court unanimously 
declared racial segregation in education to 
be unconstitutional. When the justices forge 
common ground, it signals to the nation the 
deep-seated roots of what the court has said 
and contributes to stability in the fabric of 
the law. 
The court has not always valued consensus 
so highly. At the nation’s founding, the 
justices each wrote separate opinions — 
leaving lawyers, and indeed the nation, to 
guess what the court was actually saying as 
a whole. It took Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s leadership, at the start of the 19th 
century, to bring the court together and to 
establish the practice of writing a single 
opinion for the court. Marshall was not 
above using hard and soft persuasion, going 
so far as to invite his colleagues to live 
together in a Washington boardinghouse, 
where they bonded and discussed cases over 
Madeira. Disagreement on the court in that 
century was rare, with dissents occurring 
only roughly 10 percent of the time. Chief 
Justice William H. Taft, in the first decades 
of the 20th century, reportedly talked his 
colleagues out of more than 200 dissenting 
votes with his formidable political skills. 
But the modern era has been something of a 
disaster for unanimity. Chief Justice Earl 
Warren was able to achieve unanimity only 
36.1 percent of the time; Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger, a scant 35.8 percent. One 
of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s 
final public acts was to express exasperation 
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at the fractured court. In 2005, on the final 
day of his final term, a frail Rehnquist 
described his last majority opinion by first 
outlining his views, then the three 
concurrences filed, and then the three 
dissents filed, and joking, “I didn’t know we 
had that many people on our court.” 
Compare that talk, and those numbers, to 
what Chief Justice John G. Roberts 
Jr. achieved this year with his colleagues. 
People remember Chief Justice Roberts’s 
2005 confirmation hearing for his statement 
that his job would be to call balls and 
strikes. But something else he said is worth 
remembering: that he would try to bring 
about “a greater degree of coherence and 
consensus in the opinions of the court.” He 
pointed to Warren’s leadership in Brown as 
an example. 
Unanimity, of course, would mean little if it 
were reserved only for minor things. But the 
court was unanimous this term in cases that 
posed big central questions, like whether the 
government could search your cellphone 
without a warrant, whether software could 
be patented, whether the rules for class-
action securities lawsuits should change, and 
many others. Those cases were not easy 
ones. In the cellphone case, the government 
made forceful points about the ways in 
which those searches were permissible, and 
indeed necessary, for law enforcement. The 
software industry and its foes argued 
vociferously about whether software patents 
were destroying the economy or creating it. 
And so on. What’s more, the court wasn’t 
unanimous because the justices sat on their 
hands; to the contrary, they reversed the 
lower court 74 percent of the time this year. 
Many justices have pointed out the 
importance of published dissent. There is no 
doubt that dissents can serve a useful role by 
explaining when a justice thinks the majority 
has gone off the deep end. But unanimity 
also sends its own powerful message — one 
that might be eclipsed in the headlines by a 
sensational dissent, but could ultimately 
have a greater impact. Take the abortion 
decision on Thursday, which was unanimous 
in its bottom line, but not in its reasoning. 
Chief Justice Roberts joined four justices 
appointed by Democratic presidents — the 
same lineup that saved the Affordable Care 
Act two years ago, that time for a liberal 
result, unlike Thursday’s. 
This path, of trying to forge places of 
agreement even among people who are 
inclined to disagree, is the essence of what 
the American experiment is all about. In an 
era when the leadership of the House of 
Representatives is suing the president, when 
people across the aisle cannot even be in the 
same room with one another, the modesty 
and cultivated collegiality of the nine 
members of the Supreme Court this year 
remind us all that there is another way. 
Instead of worrying about balls and strikes, 
Chief Justice Roberts has shifted his efforts 
to a new focus: making all nine justices play 
ball for the same team. The country, and the 
rule of law, are better off for it. 
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“With Filibuster Threat Gone, Senate Confirms Two Presidential Nominees” 
New York Times 
Jeremy W. Peters 
December 10, 2013 
The Senate slowly began working its way 
through a backlog of presidential nominees 
on Tuesday now that Republicans are 
virtually powerless to block confirmations, 
approving a once-stalled judge to a powerful 
appeals court and a new director for the 
agency that oversees federal home lending. 
But Republicans, still seething over a power 
play last month by Democrats to curtail the 
filibuster significantly, have settled on a 
strategy for retribution: Make the 
confirmation process as time-consuming and 
painful as possible for Democrats. 
“There’s a price that has to be paid when 
people abuse the rules,” said Senator Orrin 
G. Hatch, Republican of Utah. “And let’s 
face it. These guys have completely 
obliterated the rules.” 
And so the tone was set for the final days of 
the 2013 Senate session, a period that 
promises to be longer on acrimony than on 
productivity. 
With little actual legislation expected as the 
Senate winds down before its Christmas 
recess in less than two weeks, Democrats, 
who control the action on the floor, have 
decided to use their new power to push 
through dozens of presidential nominees for 
everything from high-profile positions like 
the secretary of homeland security to more 
obscure ones like ambassador to Albania. 
But the two-century-old Senate rule book 
still offers the minority party plenty of 
avenues to stall even if the filibuster is not 
an option. Like a losing team using up all its 
timeouts before the end of a game, 
Republicans have started to take advantage 
of those alternatives and vowed on Tuesday 
to continue doing so as long as they could. 
“It’s very important that we do what we 
think is necessary to bring home the point 
that they broke the rules,” said Senator John 
McCain, Republican of Arizona. “They have 
basically violated everything I’ve known of 
as a member of the United States Senate. 
For us to say that’s fine, business as usual, is 
not something that we could possibly do.” 
Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the 
Republican leader, said flatly, “If the 
majority can’t be expected to follow the 
rules, then there aren’t any rules.” 
Republicans have employed several tactics 
already, including one on Tuesday that 
forced the abrupt adjournment of the 
confirmation hearing for President Obama’s 
choice to lead the Internal Revenue Service, 
John A. Koskinen. They also forced the 
Senate to burn through all four hours of 
mandatory debate time on the nomination of 
Representative Melvin Watt, the North 
Carolina Democrat picked to head the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency. Often 
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senators will reach an agreement to yield 
that time. 
Mr. Watt’s nomination was ultimately 
confirmed Tuesday by a vote of 57 to 41. 
The nomination of Patricia Ann Millett to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit also cleared the 
Senate, 56 to 38. 
Democrats said they saw Republican efforts 
to slow down the confirmation process as an 
exercise in venting frustration. “It’s 
retaliatory,” said Senator Tom Harkin, 
Democrat of Iowa. “It’s revenge,” he added, 
noting that Democrats had a way of making 
things unpleasant themselves: by forcing 
Republicans to be on the Senate floor while 
they draw things out. 
“They’re going to have to keep speaking for 
four hours or eight hours at a time,” Mr. 
Harkin said. “And I don’t think they’ll have 
the stomach to do that on Fridays and 
Saturdays.” 
Some Republicans are reluctant to dwell on 
nominations too long out of fear that it will 
distract from their efforts to focus attention 
on the problems with the Affordable Care 
Act. 
Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the majority 
leader, has vowed to keep the Senate in 
session right up until Christmas if he needs 
to. But Republicans have shown no signs 
that they are bluffing. Many of them are still 
in shock that Mr. Reid resorted to the rule 
change — so divisive it is known as the 
nuclear option — when he used a 
parliamentary tactic to alter the filibuster 
rules with a simple majority vote. 
Ordinarily, Senate rules changes require a 
two-thirds majority, or 67 votes. 
“I don’t think I’ve ever felt any worse about 
the institution as I do today,” said Senator 
Lindsey Graham, Republican of South 
Carolina, who said Republicans should 
make their displeasure as clear as they 
could. “I don’t know where this all ends,” he 
added. 
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“Senate Confirms Obama Nominee Under New Filibuster Rules, World 
Doesn’t End” 
Huffington Post 
Jennifer Bendery 
December 10, 2013 
Senate Republicans warned Democrats of 
the grave consequences of going "nuclear" 
with filibuster rules, saying it would destroy 
comity and come back to haunt them when 
they're in the minority. 
But Democrats went ahead and changed the 
rules anyway, and now we're seeing what a 
nuclear explosion looks like in the Senate: a 
noncontroversial judge was approved 
Tuesday by a majority vote, 56-38. 
Patricia Millett's confirmation to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit makes 
her the first nominee to move forward in a 
post-filibuster reform world. Democrats 
have plenty of other nominees lined up 
behind her now that it only takes 51 votes to 
advance executive and judicial nominees 
(except for Supreme Court nominees, who 
still require 60 votes). 
A senior Democratic aide said the Senate 
will vote on about a dozen nominees before 
adjourning for the year, including some, like 
Millett, who Republicans previously 
filibustered for reasons that have nothing to 
do with their credentials. They include two 
other D.C. Circuit nominees, Janet Yellen 
for the Federal Reserve and Mel Watt for the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency. All are 
expected to get confirmed this time around, 
many with GOP support. 
President Barack Obama praised the 
Senate's action and noted that Millett's vote 
passed with some GOP support. Sens. Lisa 
Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Susan Collins 
(R-Maine) voted for her confirmation. 
"I'm pleased that in a bipartisan vote, the 
Senate has confirmed Patricia Millett to be a 
judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, filling a 
vacancy that has been open since 2005," 
Obama said in a statement. "She has served 
in the Department of Justice for both 
Democratic and Republican Presidents. I'm 
confident she will serve with distinction on 
the federal bench." 
But just because it's easier for Democrats to 
move nominees on the Senate floor doesn't 
mean Republicans won't continue holding 
them up at other stages of the confirmation 
process. 
In addition to GOP senators simply not 
making recommendations for nominees to 
fill court vacancies in their home states, The 
Huffington Post has counted at least 13 
nominees currently stalled in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee because of nine 
Republicans (and one Democrat) refusing to 
put forward "blue slips," or a tradition in the 
committee that allows senators to advance or 
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block judicial nominees from their home 
state. 
Many of the stalled nominees hail from 
Arizona, with Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) 
being the top offender in not submitting blue 
slips. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) is refusing 
to submit a blue slip for his own nominee, 
William Thomas, who would be the first 
openly gay black male federal judge if 
confirmed. Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) is 
withholding a blue slip for another key 
nominee, Jennifer May-Parker, who would 
fill the longest standing district court 
vacancy in the country. 
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the committee 
chairman, seems content to keep the blue 
slip rule in place for now. 
"I assume no one will abuse the blue slip 
process like some have abused the use of the 
filibuster to block judicial nominees on the 
floor of the Senate,” Leahy said in a 
statement after the Senate changed its 
filibuster rules. “As long as the blue slip 
process is not being abused by home-state 
senators, then I will see no reason to change 
that tradition.” 
But Michelle Schwartz of Alliance for 
Justice, a left-leaning association of more 
than 100 organizations focused on the 
federal judiciary, said GOP senators are 
already misusing the blue slip rule and her 
group is prepared to pressure Democrats to 
nix the tradition if things get any worse. 
"We have seen Republicans withhold blue 
slips from qualified nominees and there is 
serious concern that they will only intensify 
that practice now that another means of 
obstruction has been foreclosed," Schwartz 
said. "If Republicans abuse the blue slip 
courtesy as they abused the filibuster, then 
we will ask the Senate to reform that process 
as well." 
 
 
